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Abstract
Tobacco smoking harms health. Taxes and regulations can reduce that
harm. But evasion reduces the efficacy of taxes and regulations and creates
harms of its own in the form of illicit markets. Enforcement can reduce evasion
but creates additional harms, including incarceration and violence. Peter Reuter has pointed out that a flat ban on cigarettes would be likely to generate
illicit-market harms similar to the harms of existing illicit drug markets. Taxes
and regulations can be thought of as “lesser prohibitions,” subject to the same
sorts of risks. Minimizing total harm means minimizing the sum of abuse
harms and control harms.
Tighter regulations and higher taxes on cigarettes risk increasing the size
of the existing illicit tobacco markets, which are already substantial. That risk
can be somewhat blunted by increasing enforcement effort, but doing so can be
costly on several dimensions and might, under plausible assumptions, lead to
an increase in violence. Tobacco policymaking should therefore consider illicit
markets and the need for enforcement; some of the health benefits of regulation and taxation may be offset by increased illicit-market side effects and
enforcement costs. The presence of licit substitutes, such as e-cigarettes, can
greatly reduce the size of the problem; the regulation of e-cigarettes should
take this effect into account. If enforcement is to be increased to counterbalance tightened controls, positive-feedback dynamics suggest that the
enforcement increase should precede, rather than follow, the tightening.
1. Introduction
Cigarette smoking and other uses of tobacco damage health, and restrictions (taxes and regulations, or, in the extreme, prohibition) are intended
to reduce that damage As Peter Reuter has pointed out (Reuter, 2013), full
prohibition would be expected to have some of the bad effects of the prohibitions of other drugs: illicit markets and the costs of enforcement.
Regulations and taxes can be thought of as lesser prohibitions, and create to some extent similar opportunities for profitable evasion. Markets already
exist for cigarettes produced and transported in violation of laws, including
cigarettes licitly produced and sold in low-tax jurisdictions and smuggled into
higher-tax jurisdictions.
Illicit transactions reduce what would otherwise be the efficacy of taxes
and regulations in reducing consumption and thus protecting health, in addiNovember 14, 2013
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tion to generating damage to health and other values on their own account:
violence, corruption, incarceration, and impairment of collective social capital.
As stricter controls on cigarettes are implemented, we should expect to
see an expansion of supply-side smuggling activity, counterfeiting, and tax
avoidance, in addition to a wide variety of other demand-side priceminimization strategies to avoid the effects of any regulatory change. Optimal
decisionmaking about taxes and regulations would weigh the health and other
harms from illicit markets against the health gains from reduced smoking. In
addition to choosing taxes and regulations, public authorities can control the
consequences of violating those rules both by setting penalty levels and by
choosing enforcement strategies and resource levels.
To the extent that other options are widely available to smokers, the public-health benefıts of higher taxes and stricter regulations will be reduced, given
that at least some smokers will turn to these strategies in order to minimize the
impact of the tax increase on the price they pay for cigarettes. In the event of
bans on particular types of cigarettes (e.g., flavored cigarettes of various kinds),
some users of those types will turn to contraband product rather than (as intended) giving up smoking entirely. This paper will develop a model of the
demand for contraband product in the event of a ban and the consequent level
of crime that might follow.
Thus, in deciding whether to tighten controls on cigarettes in various
ways, the question facing policymakers becomes: How much health benefit will
a tighter rule in fact create, once the effects of evasion are considered, and
would that health gain justify the increase in damage from criminal activity
and enforcement?
2. Consequences of Stricter Regulation and Taxes
2.1.

Smuggling, Tax Evasion, and Violence

Tobacco-tax evasion and smuggling is widespread. Joossens and Raw
(2008, 2012) estimate that illicit tobacco transactions lead to $40 to $50 billion
in lost tax revenue globally, while the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) (2009) estimates that tobacco diversion costs over
$5 billion in revenue from unpaid excise taxes annually in the United States.
LaFaive and Nesbit (2013) report that the five smuggling-destination states
with the highest cigarette-smuggling rates are New York (60.9 percent of the
state’s total consumption), Arizona (54.4 percent), New Mexico (53.0 percent),
Washington (48.5 percent), and Rhode Island (39.8 percent). Five source states
had estimated net total smuggling exports that exceeded ten percent of total
state consumption: Virginia, Delaware, West Virginia, Missouri and Wyoming.
The impact of evasion on cigarette consumption, and thus on health, is
substantial, but its extent is controversial. Stehr (2005) estimates that up to 85
November 14, 2013

Page |3

Unintended Consequences of Cigarette Taxation and Regulation
percent of the “tax paid sales response” to increases in cigarette excise taxes in
the United States may be due to tax avoidance rather than reduced consumption. DeCicca, Kenkel, and Liu (2010) find that many U.S. cigarette taxes are
above their revenue-maximizing level, resulting in an increase in tax avoidance,
smuggling, and black-market selling. And Henchman and Drenkard (2013) find
that smuggling rates generally rise in states after they adopt large cigarette-tax
increases. However, in studies of global tobacco markets, Joossens, Ross, Merriman, and Raw (2009) claim that cigarette taxes have relatively little impact on
the level of illicit trade, and Merriman, Yurekli, and Chaloupka (2000) conclude
that higher cigarette taxes achieve both objectives of higher tax revenues and
lower consumption.
LaFaive, Fleenor, and Nesbit (2008) divide cigarette smuggling into two
types: “casual” smuggling, where consumers save money by buying cigarettes
in lower-tax states or countries,1 and “commercial” smuggling, where largerscale operators buy cigarettes in bulk in a lower-tax area and sell them tax-free
in higher-tax areas. The U.S. Department of the Treasury (2010) finds that a
significant component of illicit tobacco trade in the United States is the shipment of tobacco products from low-tax states to high-tax states to evade state
taxes. Due to widely varying state taxes on wholesale tobacco products, ample
opportunity exists to transport tobacco from a low-tax jurisdiction to a high-tax
jurisdiction for retail sale or consumption to evade state taxes. Lovenheim
(2008) finds that 13 to 25 percent of U.S. consumers purchase cigarettes in
border locations, greatly reducing the potential health and revenue gains from
cigarette taxation.
With black markets come organized crime and violence; New York City’s
Finance Administrator described bootleg cigarettes as the “principal stoking
facility of the engine of organized crime” (Fleenor, 2003, p. 7) and as constantly
confronting workers with personal violence. LaFaive and Nesbit (2013) link
bootleg cigarettes to an uptick in prison crime, while the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (2008) details the impact illicit cigarette trafficking has on
supporting terrorist organizations worldwide.
2.2.

Smoker Responses

Smokers employ a variety of legal and illegal strategies to reduce the
price they pay for cigarettes (Chaloupka, 2013; Xu et al., 2013). According to
an analysis of the International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation FourCountry Survey (Licht et al., 2011a), in response to increased cigarette taxes 8
percent of smokers reported buying from low or untaxed sources, 36 percent
switched to discount or generic brands, and 14 percent used loose tobacco
(“roll-your-own”). Licht et al. (2011b) report that smokers who use these priceSuch behavior is not necessarily illegal: small quantities of cigarettes imported for personal
use are exempt from federal-excise-tax requirements, and most states exempt small quantities
from use-tax requirements.
1
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minimizing strategies are less likely to make attempts to quit smoking and less
likely overall to succeed when they do attempt to quit; should tax increases
further raise the retail price of cigarettes, these smokers would constitute a
potential market for illicit product, depending on their comfort with engaging
with a black market and on the level of enforcement.
Cigarette smokers can also switch from cigarettes to other tobacco products because of the lower taxes on the latter. Connolly and Alpert (2008)
attributed nearly a third of the decline in legal cigarette sales in the United
States over the previous decade to switching to tobacco products such as small
cigars, moist snuff, and loose tobacco. Pomeroy (2012) reports that, due to the
increase in federal taxes on cigarettes in 2009, monthly sales of pipe tobacco
and large cigars skyrocketed over the next three years. Tynan, McAfee, Promoff,
and Pechacek (2012) conclude that large tax differentials between cigarettes
and other tobacco products lessen the impact of taxes on smoker behavior and
public health.
3. Enforcement and Violence: What Do We Know?
Illicit drug markets are prone to violence (Andreas & Wallman, 2009).
The value of illegal goods coupled with the lack of recourse in the legal system
to settle conflicts creates inherent instabilities, uncertainties, and distrust in
the market. This is exacerbated by illicit-market participants’ pre-existing experiences with violence; participants tend to be recruited from communities with
above-average rates of violence (Moeller & Hesse, 2013). A number of explanations is offered for why stricter enforcement of illicit drug markets might
increase violence, but two stand out in the literature. First, increased enforcement disrupts the market. Destabilizing established hierarchies renews
competition and violence can follow as participants jostle for turf and market
share (Costa Storti & De Grauwe, 2008; Papachristos, 2009; Rasmussen &
Benson, 1994). Second, stricter enforcement increases the risk of detection and
punishment, which in turn increases the risk premium and therefore profitability of sales (Kuziemko & Levitt, 2004). Profit margins become worth fighting for:
Increasing the share of total cost attributed to enforcement risk can increase
the incentive for violence insofar as violence deters enforcement agencies and
potential informants (Caulkins, Kleiman, & Kulick, 2010; Kleiman, 2011).
Moeller and Hesse (2013) assert that the relationship between the intensity of drug-law enforcement and violence in drug markets follows from how
enforcement affects the market’s structure. Low levels of enforcement tend to
result in monopolistic markets, dominated by a few well-organized suppliers.
They tend to be nonviolent, because violence attracts the attention of authorities. Reuter (1983) argues that well-behaved, concentrated industries such as
these are unusual in illegal drug markets because pressure from law enforcement tends to stimulate competition among rivals.
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The most extensive systematic review of the relationship between druglaw enforcement and violence (excluding police violence) is by Werb et al.
(2011). We expand and update this review,2 but our inclusion criteria deviate
from theirs in several ways:
1. Period of study: Our review includes studies published in the last 25
years (August 1988 to August 2013).
2. Type of publication: We restrict our review to studies published in
peer-reviewed journals.
3. Qualifying methods: We include only studies that present the results
of quantitative research (cross sectional or longitudinal). We exclude
studies that exclusively report a theoretical model without analysis of
empirical data on enforcement and violence, and we exclude studies
that are limited to qualitative analysis.
Drug-market violence is taken to include homicides, assaults, and shootings that stem from the illegal market. Law-enforcement intensity is taken to
include any reasonable proxy measure; these included number of drug arrests,
expenditures on enforcement, drug-seizure rates, and number of police officers.
Fourteen studies meet our inclusion criteria,3 with considerable variation
in methods, reporting periods, and proxy measures of enforcement and violence. These definitional differences preclude their enforcement-effect estimates
being combined using traditional meta-analysis techniques. Even so, the
weight of the evidence falls squarely on the side of a significant positive association between enforcement intensity and violence. Two of the studies reviewed
(14 percent) found no association between levels of enforcement and violent
crime; the remaining 12 studies (86 percent) found a positive association between enforcement and crime. A summary of the studies reviewed and a
description of their findings are provided in the Appendix.
4. Theoretical Relationship between Enforcement and Violence
4.1.

Overview

When considering a hypothetical illicit market, it is reasonable to expect
there to be an inverted-U-shaped relationship between enforcement and violence. For lower levels of enforcement, increases in enforcement activity can be
expected to lead to more violence. Systematic reviews of the relevant literature
We follow the search methods used by Werb and colleagues, which relied on conventional
search techniques of English-language articles (see Werb et al. (2011) for an elaboration of
search tools), and we use the same search terms (“violence,” “drug-related violence,” “drugmarket violence,” “enforcement,” “drug gangs,” and “drug crime”). Our search yielded four
studies meeting inclusion criteria that were not included in the earlier review.
3 Compared with fifteen that met the criteria of Werb et al. (2011).
2

November 14, 2013

Page |6

Unintended Consequences of Cigarette Taxation and Regulation
on the relationship between enforcement and violence conclude that “disrupting drug markets [through enforcement] can paradoxically increase violence”
(Werb et al., 2011, p. 87).
The expectation that enforcement leads to violence follows from what
Goldstein (2003) terms the systemic aspect of the drug/violence nexus. Systemic violence stems from the “traditionally aggressive patterns of interaction
within the system of [illicit] drug distribution and use” (p. 100). The causes of
such violence include (inter alia) territorial disputes, homicides committed to
enforce norms among the distribution hierarchy, the elimination of informers,
punishment for selling fake or adulterated goods, and violence associated with
robberies in areas known for drug activity. As enforcement increases, the
stakes become higher for market participants and violence increases (Caulkins,
Reuter, & Taylor, 2006). We formalize and explain how this occurs in our model
below, but the main idea is that, as prices and revenues rise in the industry in
response to increased enforcement, the attendant violence in the market can be
expected to rise.
Reinforcing the systemic contribution to violence, the economic compulsive aspect of the drug/violence nexus (Goldstein, 2003) may reinforce the
positive association between enforcement and violence. As enforcement increases and street prices for the illegal substance rise, users may turn to
robbery or other crimes to raise cash to support their habit. This contributing
factor may not be as strong for cigarettes as for currently illegal drugs, however. The third of Goldstein’s violence factors, the psychopharmacological aspect,
is unlikely to contribute much. Irritability associated with withdrawal symptoms, which may be expected to increase at least temporarily due to higher
prices from increased enforcement, has been associated with violent crime
among opiate users (Goldstein, 1979). Again, however, this factor is likely to be
negligible for tobacco users—indeed, for most drug markets, the violence attendant to illicit sales swamps drug-induced violence.
At levels of enforcement high enough to substantially shrink market volumes and total revenues—assuming that such levels are practically
attainable—it seems clear that violence should begin to fall. With police presence on every street, intense scrutiny of every shipment of goods into the
country, and complete control of the borders, the quantity of illicit goods transacted must surely fall to low levels. Apart from the deterrence and
incapacitation effects on the market of high levels of enforcement, the economic
fundamentals of the market also lead to the same conclusion. We show below
in our model that, under reasonable assumptions, revenue must eventually
begin to decrease with more enforcement. Whether this can be effected at realistic and tolerable enforcement levels is another question, and is likely to
depend on the details of the illicit-substance market under study (Reuter &
Kleiman, 1986); a possible ban on menthol cigarettes is illustrative.
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Here we offer an economic analysis of cigarette taxes and regulations,
black markets, and violence. We acknowledge that this form of analysis misses
important sociological, legal, and other factors of the market. The research
provided here is intended to complement the insights from other fields.
4.2.

Background on the Economics of Smoking

Crucial to the modeling below will be some sense of how elastic is the
demand for smoking cigarettes, and how that elasticity compares with the supply elasticity. The excellent review article by Chaloupka and Warner (2000)
covers the twentieth-century literature on the econometric estimation of demand for smoking cigarettes in general. They summarize the literature as
finding results in the broad range of −0.14 to −1.23 for demand elasticity. Importantly, however, once a few outlying studies are excluded, they conclude
that most studies find results in the relatively narrow band of demand elasticities between −0.3 and −0.5. Chiou and Muehlegger (2008) report demand
elasticities (including both the decision to smoke and the intensity of smoking
among those who smoke) of −0.29 to −0.56. Thus, an important conclusion for
the present work is that we can assume that cigarette smoking is highly inelastic.4
What about the demand for menthol cigarettes in particular? We may
suspect that the elasticity of demand is higher the more narrowly we define the
product category, because, when the price of one type of cigarette rises, consumers can switch to other types. However, what little evidence there is does
not appear to bear this out. One of the very few econometric studies estimating
any part of the demand decision for menthol cigarettes, Tauras et al. (2010),
concluded that “menthol and non-menthol cigarettes are not close substitutes”
(p. 121). Their estimated switching elasticity of −0.24, which they calculate
conditional on being a smoker, means that a 10 percent increase in the price of
menthol cigarettes is associated with a 2.4 percent decrease in the probability
of being a smoker of menthol cigarettes. These few individuals are the only
ones who switch to smoking non-menthol cigarettes. While Tauras et al. (2010)
do not estimate the other relevant parts of the inclusive demand elasticity—the
extensive margin of the smoking-participation decision and the intensive margin of how many menthol cigarettes to smoke—there is no reason to believe
that the inclusive elasticity is greater than one. Most of the studies cited by
Chaloupka and Warner (2000) that find elasticity in the range −0.3 to −0.5
include both the extensive and intensive margins. Since the elasticities from
As there is already a substantial black market in cigarettes in the United States, estimates
based solely on official counts of legal sales would tend to overstate the demand elasticity (i.e.,
with a price increase that drives some smokers to the black market the reduction in consumption would be overestimated.) However, most of these studies are from survey of individuals
about all use, legal or otherwise. Furthermore, to the extent that people still lie and underreport their illicit consumption, the log-log specification in most studies will still get at the true
elasticity, as all changes are in percentage terms and not levels.
4

November 14, 2013

Page |8

Unintended Consequences of Cigarette Taxation and Regulation
each part of the demand process are additive,5 even adding the switching elasticity of −0.24 (Tauras et al., 2010) keeps the elasticity range well within the
inelastic region.
Other studies looking specifically at demand for menthol cigarettes also
come to the conclusion that demand is relatively insensitive to price. Compass
Lexecon (2011) finds in an econometric study6 that a 10 percent increase in the
effective price7 of illegal menthol cigarettes would be associated with a 1 percent decline in overall smoking, and that a 50 percent increase in the price
would reduce smoking by only 3.5 percent.
Furthermore, the demand for cigarettes is likely to be much less elastic
than the supply in the long run. Supply elasticities are properties of production
technology and costs in a competitive market. The more slowly costs rise as
quantity produced increases, the higher the supply elasticity. Given the economies of scale in the tobacco-products industry and the easy conversion of
producing and packaging menthol cigarettes to doing the same for nonmenthol cigarettes, it is quite likely that the supply function for menthol cigarettes is highly elastic. Lending credence to our supposition, Sumner and
Wohlgenant (1985) found in a rigorous study of supply and demand conditions
for cigarettes in the United States that “the derived supply curve for cigarettes
is nearly horizontal” (p. 241) (even when the domestic supply of raw tobacco is
inelastic due to agricultural quotas). The ratio of demand to supply elasticity
will show up in the modeling work below, and we argue that it is likely to be
small in magnitude, given the inelasticity of demand and the likely high elasticity of supply.
4.3.

The Model

Consider a retail market for menthol cigarettes that would be competitive
in the absence of taxes or a ban. While some studies examine noncompetitive
illicit-drug markets (e.g., Caulkins, Reuter, & Taylor, 2006), assuming a competitive market allows intuitive analysis with the standard tools of supply and
demand. The other assumptions and notation are these:


The legal market (before a ban) is taxed with a revenue tax of rate . We will
treat the tax as if it were levied on consumers.8 The tax is depicted graphically in

See Chiou and Muehlegger (2008) for a proof.
This study was funded by a tobacco company and was not peer reviewed.
7 The effective price includes not only the purchase price, but also the costs to the consumer of
participating in the black market.
8 This is just for analytic convenience. Basic microeconomic theory shows that the legal incidence of the tax does not affect the actual economic incidence of the tax, and so our
assumption is immaterial even if in actuality tobacco taxes are levied on the retailer.
5
6
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Figure 1 as shifting the demand curve (marked D) down, creating a wedge of
size
between the actual demand curve and the demand curve modified to
show how much of the total price per unit (including the tax) goes to the
seller (marked Dt). The figure is the standard textbook case of a revenue tax.
In the figure, the price including the tax at
is
, of which amount
per unit is received by the seller as revenue and
per unit is collected
as tax revenue.9

Figure 1. The impact of revenue taxation on demand.

D

p
Dt

tp1

{

(1 + t)p1
p1

Q

Q1



The ban is denoted with a binary variable
ban,
.



Enforcement is treated as a continuous variable
. For example, might
be expenditure on enforcement (or, to set aside questions of inefficient
spending, the minimum expenditure necessary to achieve a given real outcome related to enforcement, the number of police officers devoted to
enforcing the ban, or the number of arrests). It is assumed that when
,
10
we also have
.



On the supply side, enforcement of the ban raises the effective marginal cost
of doing business by a fraction . These additional costs include the perceived risk of arrest, sanction, fine, or incarceration, as well as any supplydisruptive activity following from enforcement, such as product seizure. We
assume the cost rises with enforcement:
is a smoothly increasing con-

. Without a ban,

. With a

For readers less familiar with the historical quirks of economic pedagogy, note that the demand function expresses the quantity demanded as a function of the good’s price, while it is
traditional to graphically depict the relationship in inverse form with price on the vertical axis.
Thus the demand curve is drawn as if price were a function of quantity. The same inverse
relationship holds between the supply function and the supply curve.
10 As part of assuming that
before a ban, we set aside any considerations involving the
possibility of tax evasion in the legal market.
9
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⁄
⁄
cave function, with
,
, and
.11 The concavity of
the additional cost reflects diminishing returns to enforcement effort (as
would be the case, for example, if the most productive enforcement efforts
directed toward suppliers are taken first). However, for mathematical convenience
is unbounded. This reflects the assumption that the marginal
product of enforcement never falls to zero. Figure 2 depicts the function ,
and Figure 3 depicts its effect (for a given level of enforcement) on the supply curve.
Figure 2. The level and shape of function φ (or ρ).

(e)

(or (e))

e
Figure 3. The impact of enforcement on the supply curve.12

S′

S

p

[1 + (e)]p0
po

S-1(p0)



Q0

Q

[ ] of consumers are law-abiding, in the sense that, regardA fraction
less of the street price of banned cigarettes, they would never purchase any
after a ban. These consumers either switch to legal cigarettes or quit smok-

Just because costs rise with enforcement does not mean that enforcement need be very
effective at raising costs for suppliers, just that it does at least a little. Reuter and Kleiman
(1986) argue that enforcement in marijuana and cocaine markets had little effect on dealer and
distributor costs.
12 For an explanation of the quantity
in Figure 3, see Equation 2′ and fn 14 below.
11
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ing. We assume that the smoking intensity (i.e., the quantity of cigarettes
consumed) of these consumers is completely typical, so that after a ban the
demand curve for menthol cigarettes is only
what it was before the
ban, all else equal. Figure 4 depicts the impact of on demand (drawn for
).
Figure 4. Shift in the demand curve due to ℓ.
D curve
with ℓ = 0

p

D curve
with ℓ = ½

Q


Enforcement may also impact demand directly, apart from its indirect impacts through the price mechanism. If enforcement targets users, then the
perceived inclusive price of the product rises by fraction
. (User-targeted
enforcement is included here as a general feature of drug-enforcement models. In the case of illicit cigarettes, enforcement is unlikely to target smokers,
except for minors.) The consumers treat this like a “risk tax.” We assume
the risk tax rises with enforcement:
is a smoothly increasing, concave
⁄
function, with
, ⁄
, and
. The concavity of the risk
tax reflects diminishing returns to enforcement effort (as would be the case,
for example, if the most productive enforcement efforts directed toward consumers are taken first). The shape of function
is similar to that of
in
Figure 2, although we do not assume they are the same function. Note that
we have simplified the model by not defining separate variables for enforcement levels on the supply and demand sides. Instead, we assume any
differential impact of enforcement on the two sides of the market caused by
different allocations of enforcement effort split between the two is captured
by the shapes of the functions and themselves. The impact of demandside enforcement on the demand curve is as for the revenue tax in Figure 1,
with replacing .



The quantity demanded in the absence of a ban is a downward-sloping
function
, where is the price consumers must pay. We assume
is a
⁄
differentiable function, and denote the demand elasticity with
(so that
is a positive number). Given the empirical evidence reviewed
above, we assume that demand is inelastic in the relevant range of prices:
(although we do not assume that elasticity is constant).
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The quantity supplied in the absence of a ban is an upward sloping function
, where is the price sellers receive. We assume
is a differentiable
⁄
function, and denote the supply elasticity with
.



We assume that violence rises with illicit revenue earned in the market.
Violence is a negative externality in the market for the illicit substance. At
least some of the factors associated with drug violence identified by Goldstein (2003) are closely related to revenue instead of profit. For example,
robberies of drug dealers (and the violent responses in retribution) are triggered by expectations that dealers carry large amounts of cash on their
person. Similarly, areas known for traffic in illicit substances are attractive
targets for robberies in general (not just of known dealers), since more people on the street will be buyers carrying substantial amounts of money.
Other than the monotone increasing relationship between illicit revenue and
violence (and the level assumption in the next bullet) we need make no other
assumptions about the function relating revenue to violence.



We normalize violence to zero at the revenue level associated with a ban
with no enforcement. Given the abstract nature of the model, this just
means that we set aside any violence associated with the legal tobacco market to focus on marginal changes in violence from changing the market to
an illicit one. This assumption also implies that there are no risks due to violence when there are no risks associated with running afoul of the law,
either on the demand or the supply side.



We set aside any direct beneficial effect of enforcement effort on reduction in
violence. In part this is to focus on the economic effects on violence through
the price mechanism. However, our treatment here is also in line with the
large literature noting that enforcement activity often is associated with
more, rather than less, drug violence.13

With a slight redefinition of notation, from now on will refer to the monetary price exchanging hands in the market, not including taxes or any risk
adjustments. Given the assumptions above, the quantity demanded accounting
for a possibility of taxes, a ban, and enforcement is given by the expression
[

] .

(1)

In the expression, the inclusive price the demander must pay is marked
up by the tax rate (if there is no ban) and the risk tax. The first term on the
right side of (1) accounts for the proportional reduction in demand when the
law-abiding citizens exit the market.
The quantity supplied, likewise, is given by the expression
See Zahn (1975) for an early study reviewing historical evidence from the Prohibition era
onward pointing out that prohibition and enforcement often lead to higher homicide rates.
13
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(

).

(2)

The expression discounts the monetary price to adjust for the risk incurred or supply disruption when there is enforcement.14 To simplify the
[
] , so supply can be written as
expression, we define a function
.

(2′)

Scaling by function
in the supply function thus converts market price
to the actual average revenue per unit suppliers receive after netting out enforcement costs (see Figure 3). It will be useful for what follows to note that
⁄
⁄
,
,
, and
, and
. The function is depicted in Figure 5. In equilibrium, supply matches demand and we
have
.
Figure 5. The level and shape of function ψ.

(e)

1

Q
4.4.

The Impact of a Ban15 and Enforcement on Price and Revenue

Even though enforcement in actuality will likely begin immediately upon
imposition of a ban, it is useful conceptually to think of a ban and enforcement
as occurring in two steps. We emphasize that this exercise is only for analytic
purposes and does not reflect any assumptions or requirements in our model.
When the ban is imposed in the model, but with no enforcement in place, the

The derivation of (2) follows from the fact that, in a competitive market, the supply curve is
the (inverse) marginal cost curve of the industry. If production costs as a function of are
[
] with a ban. Thus the
in the absence of a ban, then marginal costs are
[
], and inversion yields
[
inverse supply curve is given by
] . After identifying the function with inverse marginal cost, equation (2) follows. This
also explains the notation for the leftmost point on the horizontal axis in Figure 3.
15 Although, for all cigarettes, tax increases are more likely than bans, here we consider a ban,
which is the more likely case for menthol cigarettes. The analytical approaches to the two are
similar—a ban is the limiting case of a tax increase, or, conversely, a tax increase is a lesser
included case of a ban—but a ban is simpler to present.
14
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outcomes of the model—price, quantity, and revenue—change discontinuously
as switches from zero to one. This is illustrated in the following figures.
Without the ban, the transacted price in the market,
plicitly defined by
, or
[

]

.

, is the price im(3)

See Figure 6. In the figure, the tax has the effect of lowering the price
that sellers receive from the no-tax price
to . The price paid by the consumer is
plus the revenue tax, which adds another
per unit purchased.
Figure 6. Equilibrium price in a taxed, legal market.
p

D

S

(1 + t)p1
p0

p1

Q1 Q0

Q

With the ban but without enforcement, the following defines the new
price :
.

(3′)

Note that no taxes are collected in the illegal market. Figure 7 shows the
impact of law-abiding consumers leaving the market: demand shifts from D to
D′ as in Figure 4. The shift has the effect of lowering the price that buyers pay
and sellers receive from the no-tax price
to new price . Unless
, so
that the original and post-ban demand curves coincide (implying that D would
be the same as D′ in Figure 7), it cannot be determined in general which of the
two prices is higher,
or
(nor for
and ).16 If is zero, then we
would have
, and clearly then it would follow that
. However, when

In the licit cigarette market the sales price reflects production costs, taxes, and brand rent
(the difference in production costs between premium brands and discount brands is minimal
compared with the difference in their retail prices). Eliminating brand rents would drive smokers to “cheap whites,” already prevalent in Europe (Denner, 2013).
16
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, the reduction in demand from the exit of law-abiding consumers attenuates and may even reverse the price increase from the avoided taxation.17
Figure 7. Equilibrium price in an illicit market with no enforcement.

D

p

S

D′

p0
p2

Q2

Q

Q0

Regardless of which case applies, it is important to note that it does not
matter for our analysis of the link between enforcement and violence. Our assumption above was that increases in illicit revenue are associated with more
violence, and that there is no violence under conditions
,
. Thus, even
though revenue changes as we move from equation (3) to equation (3′), there is
no change in violence yet.
Now that we have our conceptual baseline of a ban but no enforcement
yet, consider how prices, revenue, and violence change as enforcement ramps
up. Define excess demand as
.
Then applying the implicit function theorem to the equilibrium condition
when there is a ban (
and
) gives an expression for how the
equilibrium (monetary) price changes with enforcement on the margin:
⁄
⁄

[

]

⁄
⁄

(

)

.

(4)

For simplicity we take ℓ to be an exogenous parameter. A more realistic (albeit more complicated) approach may be to model ℓ as a decreasing function of the quantity consumed in an
illegal market. This would introduce the notion that there may be bandwagon effects among
potential scofflaws: If there is an adequate supply of illicit goods and little or no enforcement,
some fraction of initially law-abiding consumers will see that the illegal behavior is normalized
and decide to engage in it. Witness the growth of piracy in recorded music and the near absence of use-tax payments on out-of-state purchases.
17
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In the expression, b has been set to 1 since the ban is in place.18 The
denominator of (4) is unambiguously positive, and so the sign of the expression
depends only on the numerator. Thus market price will increase on the margin,
with increases in enforcement, if and only if
(5)

.

Both sides of inequality (5) are positive, and thus whether the condition
is satisfied depends on the relative magnitudes involved. We analyze various
cases below to draw insight from the model.
To illustrate why the price effect of increased enforcement is ambiguous
in general, and to help interpret condition (5), consider Figure 8. In the left
panel, the shifts in the supply and demand curves lead to a higher price (compared to the starting point at
with the ban in place but no enforcement).
In the right panel, the shifts in the curves lead to a lower price. The left side of
inequality (5) arises from the impact on the equilibrium price from the demand
curve shifting in, which causes excess demand to fall and the price to fall. The
right side of inequality (5) arises from the impact on the equilibrium price from
the supply curve shifting in, which causes excess demand to rise and the price
to rise. Only when the latter effect outweighs the former effect does price rise
on net.
Figure 8. Changes in equilibrium price in an illicit market due to enforcement.
S′

D′

p

p

D′′

S′

D′

D′′

S

S

p'
p''

p''
p'

Q''

Q'

Q

Q''

Q'

Q

If the demand curve did not shift, and demand is inelastic as argued
above, then knowing the direction of the price change also lets us know how
revenue changes. When the demand curve itself shifts downward in response
to enforcement, however, there is a countervailing effect on revenue, as we now
18

The simplified expression in (4) uses the fact that, by definition of the elasticities, ⁄
⁄[
] when both derivatives are evaluated at the market-clearing price and quantity
.
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demonstrate.

Equilibrium revenue with a ban can be written as
, where
is the equilibrium price given enforcement level .
Thus the total impact on revenue of a marginal change in enforcement level is
(

)

(

)

(6)

price effect + demand-shifting effect.
The first term on the far right side is the price effect. When enforcement
rises, the price changes in accord with equation (4), which has a marginal impact on revenue. The term in parentheses on the far right side of equation (6) is
the usual marginal-revenue (MR) term for the impact on revenue from a marginal increase in price. For inelastic demand, for which
, this term is
always positive:
.
Thus, when the demand curve sits still, revenue change has the same
⁄ . However, the second term on the far right side of equation (6),
sign as
the direct impact of enforcement on the demand curve (the “demand-shifting”
effect), is negative, since demand slopes down. From equation (1), we have:
.
This term is the offsetting effect on revenue of the demand curve shifting
down in response to enforcement risk. Revenue falls through this channel because, with lower demand, for any given price the quantity is lower.
Thus, even when the sign on the price change is clear from inequality (5),
the total effect on revenue and therefore violence is still unclear. If the demandshifting effect is large enough, there might be less revenue in response to a
price increase. However, given the relatively small elasticity values found in the
literature for smoking in general and for menthol cigarettes in particular, we
expect that the demand-shifting effect will attenuate but not reverse the primary
impact on revenue of the price change. We therefore maintain this assumption
in what follows. In the limiting case with completely inelastic demand,
and the demand-shifting effect disappears.
4.4.1. Case 1: No direct enforcement on consumers
Consider what happens if enforcement is entirely focused on suppliers
and consumers are left alone. If enforcement does not affect the demand side at
all, then
. Then condition (5) is satisfied and the price rises with enforcement effort. If demand is inelastic, then revenue rises with the price
unambiguously (since there is no countervailing demand-shifting effect in
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equation (6)). Recall that we have assumed that violence rises with revenue.
Thus, in the case where enforcement targets the production, importation, and
distribution side of the illicit market, there will be greater violence with stronger enforcement (conditional on the ban already being in place).
This is illustrated in Figure 9. The demand curve, adjusted for the exit of
law-abiding consumers, is as in the previous figure. The supply curves with
and without the impact of enforcement are as in Figure 3. Compared to the
outcome under the ban with no enforcement at all (price
and quantity
),
the price unambiguously rises to
with enforcement only on the supply side.
Figure 9. Case 1—Equilibrium price in an illicit market with only supply-side
enforcement.

p

D′

S′
S

p3
p2

Q3 Q2

Q

4.4.2. Case 2: The long run in a constant-cost industry
In the long run in a competitive market, each producer is forced to produce at its minimum efficient scale (the cost-minimizing production quantity).
In a constant-cost industry, minimum efficient scale leads to similar costs for
all producers, and so the long-run supply curve is horizontal (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2009). In other words, the supply function is perfectly elastic. In terms
of our model, this is the limiting case in which is infinite and therefore inequality (5) is satisfied. Thus, in this important “textbook” case, greater
enforcement of a ban will unambiguously lead to higher prices. If, as argued
above, the demand-shifting effect in equation (6) does not outweigh the price
effect, there will be more revenue and therefore violence.
This case is illustrated in Figure 10, which clearly shows why there is no
ambiguity in the direction of the price change. After the ban but before enforcement, demand curve D′ and supply curve S lead to price
and quantity
. The upward shift in the supply curve (from S to S′) due to the enforcement
risk raises the price (from
to ) as suppliers require more compensation for
any given level of production. The demand curve shifting down (from D′ to D′′)
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does not further change the price, which is still
due to the elastic supply
curve, but decreases revenue a bit by reducing quantity. While quantity had
been at the intersection of S′ and D′, it now moves left to
. This offsetting
decrease in revenue is the demand-shifting effect.
Figure 10. Case 2—Equilibrium price with enforcement and perfectly elastic
supply.
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D′′
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p4
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Q5

Q4

Q

4.4.3. Case 3: No direct enforcement on suppliers
If all enforcement effort were directed at penalizing consumption of the illicit good, so that
, then condition (5) would never hold for any demand
⁄
and supply functions and
.19 In this case, both the price effect and
the demand-shifting effect work in the same direction to reduce revenue.
Therefore a greater crackdown on consumers alone will unambiguously lead to
less violence, by reducing demand. This is illustrated in Figure 11, with price
and quantity falling from
to
. In practice, however, enforcement
efforts are concentrated on suppliers rather than consumers, as their smaller
numbers make them easier to identify, their greater potential penalties more
worth the fixed costs of targeting a suspect, and their public disfavor politically
more feasible. The federal government, in particular, rarely concerns itself with
simple possession cases.

19

So long as the supply curve is not perfectly elastic, that is.
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Figure 11. Case 3—Equilibrium price in an illicit market with only demand-side
enforcement.
D’
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p7

Q7
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4.4.4. Case 4: Completely inelastic demand
If there is no responsiveness to price at all on the demand side, perhaps
because all but the hardest-core addicts have left the market due to high prices, then we have
. In this case, as in Case 2, inequality (5) is satisfied.
Price rises unambiguously. Furthermore, there is no demand-shifting effect, so
the impact on revenue is clear. More enforcement of a ban leads to more violence. This is illustrated in Figure 12, with the price rising from
to .
Figure 12. Case 4—Equilibrium price in an illicit market with perfectly inelastic
demand.
p
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4.4.5. Case 5: Higher levels of enforcement effort
Rearranging terms, condition (5) can be expressed as:
.
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Since is positive and bounded below by zero, and is unbounded, the
right side of condition (7) approaches zero as becomes large. Thus, so long as
nothing extreme happens to the elasticity ratio on the left side of inequality (7)
(and we are not in any of the limiting cases above), there will be a threshold
level of enforcement ̂ beyond which additional enforcement effort will surely
reduce revenue and hence violence. Eventually, at high enough enforcement
levels, violence will begin to fall as the quantity sold gets choked off. Nothing in
this analysis, however, suggests what that threshold would be for any particular illicit market, or whether the resultant enforcement regime (perhaps a police
state) would be tolerable.
4.4.6. Case 6: Lower levels of enforcement effort
Continuing with the analysis in the previous case, what about when
̂ ? Then the right side of (7) is large enough to satisfy the inequality for the
price to rise. The only question, therefore, is whether ̂
; that is, for some
functions and it may be that inequality (7) is never satisfied for any positive
level of enforcement. However, we argue that it is likely that ̂
for the follow20
ing reason. As Reuter and Kleiman (1986) point out, street prices are very
high for illicit drugs like marijuana, cocaine, and heroin compared to what
cost-based prices in a legal market would be. Caulkins and Reuter (1998) estimate that, for the cocaine market, compensation required for the risks involved
with producing and distributing in the illicit market accounts for one-third of
industry cost. Thus the mere fact that there is some enforcement in the arena
of currently illegal drugs has had huge impacts on prices. Given that much of
the enforcement effort is targeted toward the supply side, this argues that
(or
) is very large in magnitude at least for the first efforts at enforcement.
Thus, there is some range of enforcement levels in general (apart from some of
the special cases above) where more enforcement leads to more violence. In
particular, when enforcement is ramping up and still at a low level (depending
on the policy decision, in anticipation of, or immediately after, an increase in
regulation), the system is most vulnerable to spikes in illicit revenue and violence.
4.4.7. Summary of analysis
In the event of a ban, the level of violence occasioned by a black market,
relative to the revenue of that market, will tend to increase with enforcement
intensity, because the incentives for violence change as enforcement risks rise.
That revenue depends on both the price and the level of consumption of the
black-market good. Consumption will decrease as prices increase, all else
equal, and prices and consumption will decrease the more law-abiding (i.e., not
Reuter and Kleiman (1986) discuss this point in their conclusions, and are careful to point
out that this does not contradict their main argument, which is that the marginal impact of
additional enforcement on prices is likely to be low. That main part of their argument bolsters
the analysis above for Case 5.
20
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entering the black market) current smokers are. The price depends, as well, on
the intensity and kind (focused on the supply side or demand side) of enforcement of the ban; all else equal, stricter enforcement raises the price—unless
that enforcement is focused entirely on consumers (which is unrealistic in
practice).
The current illicit tobacco market is high-dollar, low-violence; increasing
enforcement might tend to increase violence over a fairly wide range. The particular circumstances under which increasing enforcement tends to increase
revenue (i.e., when a small increase in enforcement raises the price by proportionally more than it reduces consumption), and thereby to increase violence,
depend on the details of consumers’ sensitivity to prices and on their law abidingness. Without estimates of those consumer propensities, it is impossible to
determine the optimal degree of enforcement to minimize violence—and this is
without taking the monetary and other costs of enforcement into account. (The
research agenda below describes an approach to estimating the required consumer propensities, for the case of a ban on menthol cigarettes.) Evidence from
currently illicit drugs suggests that, at still-low-but-increasing levels of enforcement, violence increases as enforcement does.
4.5.

Menthol

Bans on particular types of cigarettes create special complexities. Menthol cigarettes are facing a possible ban in the United States (Tavernise, 2013)
and an imminent one in the European Union (Dalton & Esterl, 2013). Menthol
cigarettes constitute approximately one-third of the overall U.S. cigarette market (Canterbury, 2011; O’Connor, Bansal-Travers, Carter, & Cummings, 2012)
and account for approximately $25 billion in annual retail sales (Esterl, 2011).
The majority of menthol smokers are African American or Latino, and Winickoff
et al. (2011) and Pearson, Abrams, Niaura, Richardson, and Vallone (2012)
both report strong support for a potential menthol ban in these communities.
Menthol smokers exhibit particularly strong brand loyalties (Anderson, 2011).
Congress exempted menthol when it banned non-tobacco flavorings in
cigarettes in 2009 (Family Smoking Prevention And Tobacco Control Act, 2009),
but mandated a study of the matter by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). FDA’s Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee (2011) report
concluded, “Removal of menthol cigarettes from the marketplace would benefit
public health in the United States.” An industry-perspective report submitted
to the FDA at the same time (Heck, Hamm, & Lauterbach, 2011) acknowledged
that all cigarettes are hazardous but argued that there is no scientific basis for
regulating menthol cigarettes differently. On July 23, 2013, the FDA released a
report (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2013a) that found that menthol
cigarettes are not inherently more harmful than non-menthol cigarettes on a
unit basis, but that menthol makes it easier to start smoking and more difficult
to cut back or quit. The report was posted to begin a 60-day public-comment
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period to allow the FDA to “determine what, if any, regulatory action with respect to menthol in cigarettes is appropriate” (U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, 2013b).21,22
If menthol is banned, we might expect to see some level of “channeling”
to other tobacco products, switching to non-menthol brands or varieties, quitting tobacco altogether, tax evasion, and smuggling. Hartman (2011), O’Connor
et al. (2012), and Pearson et al. (2012) all report that 35–40 percent of menthol
smokers say they would quit smoking altogether if menthol cigarettes were no
longer available. O’Connor et al. (2012), however, report that 25 percent said
they would “find a way to buy a menthol brand,” indicating their willingness to
purchase menthol cigarettes on the black market. Tobacco-company representatives contend (Heck, Hamm, & Lauterbach, 2011; Murillo, 2011), and
industry-supported studies argue (Goozner, 2011; Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2013) that severe negative impacts on public health, criminal activity,
and tax revenues will ensue should a menthol ban pass.
An (industry-supported) analysis of proprietary data on menthol- and
non-menthol- cigarette prices and sales (Compass Lexecon, 2011) concludes
that current menthol smokers would largely turn to the black market for menthol cigarettes: A 10 percent increase in the effective price of black-market
menthol cigarettes would, by this estimate, lead to an initial decline in overall
smoking of about one percent, and black-market sales would be about 87 percent of current menthol sales; a 25 percent increase would lead to an initial
decline in overall smoking of about two percent, and black-market sales would
be about 72 percent of current menthol sales.
4.6.

Electronic Cigarettes

Electronic cigarettes (“e-cigarettes”) are a rapidly growing piece of the
U.S. tobacco-products market. They produce a nicotine-laced vapor, rather
than smoke, and currently are allowed to be used in many circumstances
where smoking is prohibited. Analysts estimate that retail and Internet sales of
e-cigarettes could reach $1–2 billion in 2013 (Associated Press, 2013b; Drill,
2013) and $10 billion (approximately ten percent of the combined conventional
and e-cigarette market)23 by 2018 (Drill, 2013). The FDA attempted to ban ecigarettes as unapproved drug/device combination products but was overruled
by the U.S. Court of Appeals in 2010 (Deyton, 2011). The court ruled that eThe release came a day ahead of a deadline for the United States to respond to the finding
last year by a World Trade Organization (2013) appeal board that upheld Indonesia’s claim that
the flavoring ban—which prohibits Indonesian-made clove cigarettes but exempts domestically
produced menthol cigarettes—constitutes an unfair trade practice. According to WTO rules, the
United States can either allow clove cigarettes, ban menthols, or be subject to retaliatory action
by Indonesia (Action on Smoking & Health, 2013).
22 The public-comment period was later extended by another 60 days, until November 23, 2013
(Menthol in Cigarettes, 2013).
23 Based on the U.S. tobacco-market projection of MarketLine (2013).
21
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cigarettes and other products made or derived from tobacco can be regulated
by the FDA as “tobacco products” under the Tobacco Control Act, and are not
drugs/devices unless they are marketed for therapeutic purposes (Deyton,
2011). The FDA is currently scheduled to release a set of proposed rules by
October 201324 (Drill, 2013), in addition to a list of dangerous chemicals found
in e-cigarettes and testing/reporting requirements for tobacco additives (Klein
Moynihan Turco LLP, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d; Mangan, 2013). These
rules may entail a ban on flavors other than tobacco, with menthol flavoring
included. New York City (Arroyo, 2013) and the State of California (Corbett,
2013) are both pursuing expanded regulations on e-cigarettes.
The health effects of e-cigarettes are a matter of debate due to a paucity
of peer-reviewed research on the subject (Head, 2011; Henningfield & Zaatari,
2010; McQueen, Tower, & Sumner, 2011). The claim that e-cigarette smoking
has only a fraction of the risks of conventional smoking is given surface plausibility by the absence of particulates, carcinogenic “tars,” and hot gases, but
nothing resembling a controlled trial has been attempted, and human-subjects
concerns might render any such study virtually impossible to conduct. Kozlowski (2007, 2013a, 2013b) claims that e-cigarettes are proven smokingcessation aids, serve harm reduction in existing smoking populations due to ecigarettes’ lack of contaminants and adulterants, and promote public health
due to the absence of smoke or secondhand smoke. Warner (2013) reports that
nicotine-only e-cigarettes are “dramatically” less dangerous than combusted
tobacco. Burstyn (2013) finds that e-cigarette users’ exposure to contaminants
in the inhaled vapor is well below workplace-safety standards for involuntary
exposure. The UK Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency
(2013) currently treats e-cigarettes as medicines for treating nicotine addiction.
The American Medical Association finds that, from a public-health perspective,
e-cigarettes may present an effective alternative to traditional tobacco use
(Head, 2011).
If e-cigarettes are much safer than traditional cigarettes and reasonably
attractive to a large share of smokers, then promoting or enabling their use
would allow for increased regulations on tobacco now by allowing non-quitting
smokers to become “vapers” instead (and thereby diverting them from black
markets). E-cigarettes, however, may present an alternative not only to smoking, but also to quitting; if appealing, inexpensive, and widely tolerated ecigarettes made it easier for smokers not to quit (by serving as a “bridge” between smoking sessions, in circumstances where smoking is prohibited or
frowned upon), then the public-health benefits of increased tobacco regulation
would not be as compelling (Benowitz & Goniewicz, 2013). There is no evidence
to date that indicates whether e-cigarettes act as a net substitute or complement to combustible cigarettes. (Another objection to e-cigarettes, that they
induce youth to use nicotine and thereby act as a gateway to smoking (Grana,
24

This action may have been delayed by the Federal Government shutdown (Sebastian, 2013).
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2013; Kelland & Hirschler, 2013) does not amount to a finding that their availability leads to greater net smoking initiation than would their prohibition, but
such a possibility is not ruled out by available data; fashion effects, in particular, are always difficult to predict.)
If menthol combustible cigarettes were to be banned, switching to menthol-flavored e-cigarettes would represent an additional choice for menthol
smokers, beyond switching to traditional cigarettes or quitting. If that choice
were popular, and if the health risks of using e-cigarettes are as much smaller
than the risks of using conventional cigarettes as has been claimed, the publichealth benefits of a menthol ban might increase while the illicit-market costs
would shrink. If a menthol ban led a sizable percentage of current menthol
smokers to switch to e-cigarettes, and to do so rather quickly, that would constitute a substantial increase in e-cigarette market penetration. This, in turn,
could yield an additional public-health benefit by making it easier (less novel)
for non-menthol smokers to switch to e-cigarettes. The increase in menthol ecigarette market penetration depends on whether the FDA moves to ban all
flavorings in e-cigarettes.
4.7.

Policy Implications

To sum up, consider which of the various cases considered above are
most likely to obtain if menthol cigarettes were banned in the United States.
Federal drug-enforcement policy has always been more oriented towards pursuing high-visibility or large players on the supply side than the demand side25
(Reuter & Caulkins, 1986) (which has Case 1 in the limit). Standard industry
considerations from microeconomics and industrial organization suggest that
there is no reason the long-run supply curve of the illicit good would not be
highly elastic (which has Case 2 in the limit). We have argued above that demand is highly inelastic (which has Case 4 as a limiting case). In each of these
cases, at least in the limit the unambiguous conclusion is that more enforcement
will lead to more violence, if there is a supply of acceptable-quality illicit menthol
cigarettes.
Is policy captive to the inexorable economics of the model? No. Several
parameters of the model are susceptible to manipulation by public policy, apart
from the choice of enforcement level. One of the most obvious is the possibility
of increasing the elasticity of demand for menthol cigarettes by public-health
information campaigns, perhaps targeted at communities with above-average
usage rates (e.g., African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and youth). Some previous mass-media campaigns directed at public health have been shown to
have at least “small to moderate effects” on behavior (Noar, 2006), although as
the pool of remaining smokers dwindles their resistance to persuasion may
Although states and localities have varied tremendously in their own targeting and punishment of users.
25
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increase. Increasing the elasticity of demand will both shrink the market more
rapidly and—if elasticity tips into the elastic region of demand—reverse the
relationship between price and revenue that drives the pessimistic results
above. Even when failing to raise demand elasticity above 1, any increases in
magnitude will have the salutary effect of making condition (5) harder to satisfy.
Shifting more enforcement to the demand side from the supply side
would move us closer to Case 3, in which enforcement does reduce violence.
Such activity may be politically unpopular, however, and hugely undesirable on
other grounds, since it would mean more arrests of minority-group members
for trivial offenses.
4.8.

Optimal Enforcement

An optimal regulation/enforcement policy reflects a balance of the costs
and benefits of behavior under the resultant regime; the levels of both regulation and enforcement need to be determined jointly rather than taking one as
given and then optimally determining the other. The optimization calculus, in
turn, depends on estimates and valuations of the intended benefits (principally
improved health and reduced mortality), unintended consequences (many, as
discussed), and the costs of enforcing the regime. These valuations are either
disputed, even if widely adhered-to conventions exist (e.g., quality-of-lifeadjusted years for reduced mortality), or unknown (e.g., the retail price of menthol cigarettes in the event of a ban). A complete analysis is beyond the scope
of this paper (and is, in all likelihood, untenable at this time), but an approach
that allows for better decisionmaking can be sketched out.
The analytical challenge is even greater than suggested above. There is
good reason to expect that—even with great confidence in the model structure
and parameter values—there is not a single optimal regulation/enforcement
policy that can readily be achieved from a given starting point. That is, there
are multiple equilibria to which the regulation/enforcement system may settle
(Caulkins & Reuter 2010; Feichtinger & Tragler, 2001). Which equilibrium is
reached depends on the system’s history (i.e., it is “path dependent”), and moving from one equilibrium to another may entail substantial costs not reflected
in a static analysis.
In the present context, the simplest formulation of the challenge is, “How
much of a black market (and its attendant harms) are we willing to tolerate in
exchange for the health benefits of higher taxes on, or stricter regulation of,
cigarettes?” There are three notional equilibria:26
Regime

Costs

The weak-regulation, strict-enforcement regime does not apply, as strict enforcement requires something substantial to enforce.
26
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regulation
strict
strict
weak

enforcement
strict
weak
weak

use
low
high
high

crime
low
high
low

enforcement
low/high
low
low

Note that enforcement is “strict” or “weak” compared to the underlying
activity; a little bit of enforcement is sufficient to make moonshining unattractive. In any market, if there is a low violation rate initially, it is easy to detect
and punish violators, so that a low level of enforcement is sufficient to keep
crime under control, regardless of the underlying demand function.
A promising approach to determining the optimal level of cigarette regulation follows that of Poret (2009) for drug-law enforcement generally, which
seeks to minimize the total social cost (social harm from distribution and use,
cost of detection minus fines collected, minus surplus and profits).27 The actors
are a supply chain, represented as wholesalers and retailers; consumers, who
cannot be punished for using;28 and an enforcement authority, with resources
to arrest and punish sellers. The enforcement decisions that bear on outcomes
and costs are (a) allocation of monitoring efforts to wholesalers or retailers,29 (b)
efforts to increase probability of detecting illegal transactions, and (c) sanctions
to impose on convicted sellers.
Poret shows that three types of policies are optimal solutions under different conditions: strict sanctions and high probability of detection, no
detection, or no sanctions. But remember that this analysis allows for independently varying the regulation and enforcement regimes; in the case of a
specified regulatory regime an optimal solution may not be available, and a
second-best solution must be sought.
Poret also shows that, contrary to the usual assumption in the literature
on the economics of enforcement,30 the two instruments of law enforcement—
detecting transactions and sanctioning—are not necessarily substitutes:

A variety of theoretical approaches to optimal enforcement of drug laws is presented in
Baveja et al. (2000); Becker, Murphy, and Grossman (2004); Garoupa (1997); and Tragler,
Caulkins, and Feichtinger (2001). Efforts at empirical implementation include Chang, Coulson,
and Wang (2002) and Yunker (2012).
28 In this model, consumers are assumed not to be addicts—each consumer buys one unit of
drugs. Poret acknowledges this limitation, as harms incurred vary with the quantity and frequency of consumption. Application of the model to the partial prohibition of cigarettes, the
vast majority of which are consumed by nicotine addicts, would require modifying this condition.
29 Poret (2009) considers only the two extreme cases of targeting only wholesalers or only retailers; a mixed, intermediate approach is developed in Poret (2002). The essential findings of
the analysis are captured in the simplified approach.
30 See, e.g., Becker (1968).
27
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When the main cause of harm is crime, the probability of detection
and the sanction are complements. This apparently paradoxical result comes from the objective of the law enforcement policy. It is no
longer a question of deterring the drug trade, that is, by reducing
market quantities, but of minimizing the net social cost related to
illicit drugs. When the harm is such that the reduction of social
cost related to drugs is equivalent to the maximization of the drug
trade, the instruments are complementary (p. 226).
5. Policy Options
5.1.

Enforcement First, Then Regulation

Illicit markets generate positive feedback through “enforcement swamping” (Kleiman, 1993, 2009; Kleiman & Kilmer, 2009). Increased enforcement
will be more efficacious and less costly, and will yield fewer pernicious side
effects if applied before market growth than after a market is well established:
Potential violators respond to the risk of enforcement (i.e., probability of detection and arrest), which is a function of (a) enforcement resources expended and
(b) the size of the illicit market.
If a potential violator violates a ban he will suffer a punishment, . The
cost of the punishment can be thought of as the sum of all of the negative effects that attach to the sanction (fines, the unpleasantness of days
incarcerated, lost liberty and forgone income while serving the sentence, etc.).
But detection and punishment are not certain. The probability of being punishment conditional on having violated (let’s call this ), depends on the lawenforcement effort. The expected punishment is then
.
The probability of punishment,
, is an increasing function of
law-enforcement effort, (some measure of enforcement capacity, such as the
number of arrests or number of days of incarceration available), and a decreasing function of the size of the illegal market,
, over which enforcement
resources must be spread. In this case, for example, a reasonable expression
for the probability of arrest is
, where is the number of arrests, and is
the number of illegal-market participants. As
increases, the available punishment, , is divided over a larger number of illicit-market participants, so
that the risk facing any particular violator is reduced.
Now suppose that the number of illicit-cigarette-market participants increases (as a result of a menthol ban, for instance), with no concomitant
increase in enforcement. The violator’s punishment risk, , declines. When
there are many potential violators and enforcement resources are constrained,
violators face interdependent choices: the higher the overall violation rate, the
smaller the risk of punishment for any individual violator. This relation yields a
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positive-feedback loop,31 or vicious cycle: An exogenous shock (such as a ban
on menthol) increases the number of violators. The ensuing greater violation
rate reduces the individual risk, which, in turn, prompts others to join the
illicit market, which further dilutes enforcement, which further reduces the
risk of punishment, and so on. This feedback magnifies the effect of the initial
increase in illicit activity and, depending on the circumstances of the illicit
market, can “tip” the market into a high-violation equilibrium that is difficult to
disrupt. This is why it is more expensive to break up an established market
than to prevent its emergence.
Punishment is expensive, to both the agent delivering (and paying for)
the punishment and to those being punished. A well-designed enforcement
system should discourage noncompliance and impose no more sanctions than
are required to motivate the desired compliance. This principle has been long
recognized, from Beccaria (1764/1986) to recent work in behavioral economics
(McAdams & Ulen, 2008): offenders evaluate potential losses and gains in making decisions, and seek risks when losses have moderate probabilities and
gains have small probabilities.
One approach, in a case such as a menthol ban, is to increase the conditional probability of punishment in the illicit-cigarette market prior to
imposition of the prohibition. This can reduce the total enforcement cost because the new illicit market never has a chance to take hold, and the publichealth costs associated with enforcement are never realized. This increase in
enforcement need not be permanent. Detection and punishment are both expensive. The upfront investment in enforcement prior to the ban can have an
enduring effect on violation rates if it ensures that the system stays in a lowviolation equilibrium (any given violation is easier to detect, and punishment
resources are available to be meted out). But the tipping equilibria can work in
both directions; both high and low violation rates are self-sustaining. In the
absence of an upfront increase in enforcement, the system can tip into a highviolation equilibrium. Once an illicit market is well established, it is costly (in
both enforcement and the likely violence that would ensue) to tip it back to a
lower-violation equilibrium
Illicit cigarettes account for a growing share of total cigarette consumption in the United States (LaFaive & Nesbit, 2013). This trend is driven by the
large profit margins available: profits from interstate cigarette smuggling are
high compared to current enforcement, which means that, for most smugglers,
the benefits outweigh the risks. We use New York City as an illustration. Marlboros that sell for $4.50 per pack retail in Virginia can be resold wholesale in
New York City for $7.50 (compared to the fully taxed retail price of about
$12.50); a truck containing 50,000 cartons (500,000 packs) yields a gross mar-

31

“Positive,” in this sense, means self-reinforcing, rather than salutary.
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gin of $1.5 million for a drive of less than 300 miles.32 The penalty in New York
City, if caught, is $600 per carton. In expected-value terms, the smuggler
breaks even on a carton if the expected profit from the sale of a carton (gross
profits here would be $3 per pack x 10 packs per carton = $30/carton) equals
the expected costs if caught. The expected cost is the size of the fine
($600/carton) multiplied by the probability of detection (let’s call this ).
yields a breakeven probability of detection of
. The volume of
illicit cigarettes moving into New York City is massive (conservatively estimated
at five-million cartons per year), and chasing cigarette smugglers is a relatively
low priority for law enforcement. The law-enforcement resources devoted to
tobacco enforcement in New York are minimal (the city devotes five sheriff’s
deputies, two fraud investigators and a lieutenant to tobacco control) (Caruso,
2013). The size of the illicit market indicates that smugglers feel they are beating the odds.
5.2.

Reduce Incentives to Smuggle

Incentives to evade taxes depend not only on the absolute levels of taxes
and regulations but on their differences across jurisdictions, especially over
easily crossed borders. Smugglers buy cigarettes in low-tax jurisdictions and
transport them to high-tax jurisdictions. They can sell these cigarettes at a
discount to the local retail price and make a sizable profit, even having paid the
full retail price in the source jurisdiction. The greater the price differential (almost all of which reflect different tax rates), the greater the opportunities for
profit, and the larger the number of players that would consider the risk of
smuggling worthwhile.
In the United States, the state and local cigarette-excise-tax burden varies widely. Supporting a smoking habit in Virginia, which has the secondlowest tax rate in the country at $0.30 a pack, is relatively cheap, so there is
little incentive for consumers to go outside the licit market and little opportunity to smuggle even cheaper cigarettes in from another state. It is much more
expensive to be a smoker in New York, with a state tax of $4.35. And New York
City tacks on an additional $1.50. The result is massive illicit cigarette trafficking between Virginia and New York. LaFaive and Nesbit (2013) estimate that
nearly 61 percent of cigarettes sold in New York State are not fully taxed (the
highest rate in the country, due also in part to illegal sales from Indian reservations). A 2012 study commissioned by the New York Association of
Convenience Stores estimates that cigarette-tax evasion robs the state of $1.7
billion in tax revenues each year and 6200 jobs (John Dunham and Associates,
2011). Proximity to lower-priced states and efficient transport networks account for much of New York’s large illicit market, but smuggling is also a lowATF uses less conservative estimates than ours in calculating expected profits for smugglers
taking cigarettes from Virginia to New York. They provide profit estimates of $4,080,000 for a
single truckload.
32

November 14, 2013

P a g e | 31

Unintended Consequences of Cigarette Taxation and Regulation
risk enterprise in New York—the penalty for smuggling is a fine of $600 per
carton (Povich, 2013).33,34
Figure 13 uses state-level data to show the relationship between
regulation strength (here the proxy for strength of regulation is the state excise
tax per pack) and the size of the illicit market (expressed as a percentage of
total consumption). The data show a clear positive relationship between the
magnitude of the cigarette tax and the size of the illicit market. A simple linear
function fit to these data finds that a one-dollar per pack tax increase is
associated with a 15 percentage-point increase in the size of the illicit market.

The fine was raised from $150 only in June 2013. New York City is considering creating a
city fine of $2,000 for selling untaxed cigarettes (and allowing the city to close violators for 60
days), with a $5,000 fine for a second offense and mandatory revocation of the retailer’s cigarette license if it occurs within three years of the first offense. The city Finance Commissioner
said that most merchants who sell contraband cigarettes “think of our enforcement efforts as
the cost of doing business” (Associated Press, 2013a).
34 With an operating profit per carton of approximately $40 a rational smuggler would continue
with his trade if the probability of detection were less than about 0.07. There are no good data
on this risk for cigarette smugglers, but the risks for dealers in illicit drugs are typically much
lower (Bouchard & Tremblay, 2005), and there is no reason to assume that the risk for cigarette smugglers approaches this level.
33
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Figure 13. Illicit markets and cigarette taxes, 2011.

Data are from the Mackinac Center for Public Policy and the Tax Foundation. For
“percentage of consumption smuggled,” positive values indicate net inflows into the state
and negative values indicate net outflows.

We should also be concerned about a regulatory environment that puts
huge numbers of otherwise law-abiding citizens on the wrong side of the law.
Lovenheim (2008) estimates that 13 percent to 25 percent of cigarette smokers
nationwide engage in casual smuggling as a result of cross-border differences.
LaFaive and Nesbit (2011) reach similar conclusions. It is no surprise that New
York is the state with the largest share of such smokers (again, due to its proximity to lower-priced jurisdictions and the large magnitude of the price
differential). Although it is harder for authorities to prosecute these smaller
cases than commercial-scale smuggling cases, the social implications of nudging people towards illicit behavior are troubling.
The problem of differential pricing can be attacked from both sides of the
price divide. Raising taxes in Virginia can reduce smuggling as much as can
reducing them in New York.35

While equalizing taxes across states would eliminate interstate smuggling for tax avoidance
or evasion, it would invite other sources of untaxed cigarettes. At the moment, interstate
35
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Some products sold in illicit markets are near-perfect substitutes for licit
products (e.g., Virginia-sourced Marlboros sold in New York). Others are much
less so (e.g., Chinese counterfeit Marlboros sold in New York). The greater the
perceived quality gap, the smaller the resulting illicit market.
Thus the size of the market in untaxed cigarettes does not by itself
demonstrate that a large market would emerge for illicitly manufactured menthol cigarettes in the face of a ban. Consumers of cigarettes smuggled
interstate can rely on the quality-assurance efforts of licit manufacturers. Consumers of illicitly manufactured cigarettes cannot; Chinese manufacturers
appear to be much better at reproducing packaging than at reproducing product quality, because the process of counterfeiting destroys any “brand name”
incentive to provide desirable product. A manufacturer of low-quality product
does not suffer reputational harm unless consumers or middlemen can learn to
associate a given source with low quality. Apparently, street vendors of internationally smuggled and domestically produced counterfeit cigarettes have lost
most of their market share to storefront sellers of smuggled genuine product
because participants in that market have failed to solve the collective-action
reputational-externality problem. Buyers seeking to evade taxation seem to
prefer more expensive genuine smuggled product to the cheap and nasty
smokes formerly available on the street (LaFaive & Nesbit 2013). In the long
run, supply is elastic, so that someone will supply high-quality illicit product—
if not Chinese counterfeiters, then Indian reservations or smugglers of Canadian menthol cigarettes.
Both licit and illicit cigarette markets face competition from non-cigarette
products, including e-cigarettes. Cheaper and more consumer-acceptable ecigarettes will tend to shrink both sorts of cigarette markets. On the other
hand, e-cigarettes might also be complements to combustible cigarettes via
gateway effects or by reducing the pressure to quit smoking altogether. The net
health benefit or cost of taxing, regulating, or banning e-cigarettes depends on
both the cross-elasticities and the relative health harms. A ban on mentholated
combustible cigarettes would be less likely to boost the illicit market if mentholated e-cigarettes remained available.
6. Research agenda
6.1.

Demand Functions

Key to analyzing the impact on licit and illicit markets of a ban on menthol cigarettes is the ability to predict how individual smokers will respond to a
ban. A ban can have the effect of raising the price of menthol cigarettes. In the
case of a ban with effective enforcement and full compliance, the price rises to
infinity; in actuality one would expect instead that menthol cigarettes are still
smuggling is the least costly and easiest approach; with that source foreclosed, we would expect the supply from Indian reservations and Canada to increase.
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available but at higher prices.36 A menthol smoker will respond to a price increase by cutting back on the number of menthol cigarettes smoked, by selfmentholating, by switching to non-menthol cigarettes, by cessation of smoking
tobacco, or by turning to the illicit market.
Predicting how many individuals would choose each option requires
knowledge of the demand functions for regular and menthol cigarettes; in particular, estimates of the price elasticity of demand for menthol cigarettes and
the cross-price elasticity of demand for regular cigarettes with respect to
changes in the price of menthol cigarettes. Such estimates can be arrived at by
asking smokers what their plans would be under a ban or by econometric evaluation of actual demand relationships found in market data.
Economists and other social scientists generally treat actual market outcomes (“revealed preferences”) as more credible than surveys or opinion polls
(“stated preferences”) for predicting human economic behavior. While a current
smoker might state that he would cut back or quit smoking if prices reached a
certain level, that stated intention might not be consistent with the smoker’s
observed insensitivity to prices revealed by his purchases. Stated-preference
data may be subject to systematic biases. For example, in a social atmosphere
where intending to quit smoking is clearly “the right answer,” a survey respondent may be more likely to state that option than she would be to actually
quit smoking. The revealed-preference approach that underlies econometric
estimation of demand for cigarettes, on the other hand, rests on the notion that
when the consumer has to “put her money where her mouth is” her actual
preferences can be inferred by examining her actions. Thus, while the statedpreference approach allows for coming up with answers to counterfactual questions—“what would you do if menthol cigarettes were banned?”—the credibility
of the answers is questionable (and to an unknown degree).
We are aware of only two econometric studies of demand for menthol cigarettes: Tauras et al. (2010) and Compass Lexecon (2011). Each study leaves
ample scope for new work to arrive at more confident estimates of the ownprice elasticity of menthol-cigarette demand and the cross-price elasticity of
regular cigarettes. Both of these estimates are vitally important to analyze the
impact of a ban on menthol cigarettes.
Tauras et al. (2010) estimate the impact of price changes for menthol
cigarettes on one of the three relevant margins in the demand function: the
choice for a smoker to buy menthol or to buy regular cigarettes. They use
standard econometric modeling to find that smokers did not find menthol and
regular cigarettes to be close substitutes for one another. They did not, however, analyze the impact of menthol-cigarette price changes on either the usage
As noted previously, a ban would also eliminate the brand rent of licit cigarettes, which
would tend to lower the prices paid by consumers of cheap whites. It is not clear whether this
effect would overwhelm the price-increasing effects of enforcement and compliant-smoker exit.
36
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decision (how much to smoke) or the decision whether to quit smoking altogether. They also were not able to examine the most recent data from the
Tobacco Use Survey, which is now available to researchers.
Similarly, several improvements can be made to the Compass Lexecon
(2011) study. They estimate demand elasticities through two methods, a “margins analysis” and an econometric estimation. Their “margins analysis” is
based on theoretical results for monopoly pricing in an isolated product market, whereas one of their own conclusions is that the markets for menthol and
regular cigarettes are related. The econometric analysis is based on the limited
data available and could be improved profitably. Their econometric results
appear to be predisposed to find overly large price elasticities of demand. The
price variation in the study comes from expiring promotional discounts for
menthol cigarettes. However, given that cigarettes are durable goods, at best
this approach picks up short-run price elasticities driven in part by stockpiling
before the discounts end. For policy purposes when evaluating a ban, however,
longer-run elasticities are required to predict non-transient behavior. Second,
since they have data for only a single brand of menthol cigarettes, they are in
essence estimating brand elasticities, not product elasticities: Demand for any
one brand will be much more elastic than demand for the good (menthol cigarettes) itself at the market level. Using a brand elasticity for policy purposes
when evaluating the impact of banning an entire product is undesirable. Similarly, their cross-price elasticities (which are calculated as the sensitivity of
demand for non-menthol cigarettes to changes in the price of a single menthol
brand) are likely to be underestimated for the same reason. Third, they have
only eight cities in their panel for the cross-price-elasticity estimation. While a
small sample does not necessarily bias the estimates, it does make the case for
out-of-sample extrapolation (i.e., the external validity of the study) for purposes
of policy evaluation harder to support. Fourth, they do not use the actual prices customers pay but instead must rely on wholesale-price data.
Moving forward, we suggest that researchers consider estimating demand
functions for menthol and regular cigarettes using data from the Tobacco Use
Supplement (TUS) to the Current Population Survey (CPS). Data from the
2006–07 and 2010–11 waves of the TUS are now available to researchers. The
survey contains extensive data on usage, prices, and socio-demographic information. To allow for more variation in prices than is offered by state-level
analysis, we recommend specifying models at three levels of granularity: state,
county, and Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) (OMB has defined 917 CBSAs,
which notionally correspond to “cities”). The big question for county-level and
CBSA-level data is: how do we know that the smoker bought cigarettes in the
same unit where he lives? The issue of cross-jurisdictional purchases is sidestepped in state-level analysis, since (a) few people in the CPS report crossstate purchases, and (b) studies that account for cross-state purchases don’t
come to radically different results. However, cross-county or out-of-CBSA pur-
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chases would be harder to ignore. For this reason, we suggest pursuing specifications at all three levels of resolution.
Price and tax data can be supplemented with another commonly used
source: the Tax Burden on Tobacco report. Unlike in Tauras et al. (2010), it is
possible to estimate all of the relevant margins in the demand relationship: the
intensive margin of how the quantity of cigarettes consumed varies with the
relevant prices, and the two extensive margins of whether to smoke at all and,
if so, whether to smoke menthol or regular cigarettes. Coupling the estimated
elasticities with assumed illicit prices for menthol cigarettes will allow researchers to predict how many menthol smokers will quit altogether, how many
will switch to regular cigarettes, and how many will continue to smoke (illicit)
menthol cigarettes. For the latter group it is possible to predict how their usage
would decrease, if at all. This proposed analytical approach would be expected
to yield different estimates of a response to a ban than those suggested by stated-preference studies. For example, O’Connor et al. (2011) state that 36
percent of menthol smokers report that they would respond to a ban by trying
to quit smoking. The estimated cross-price elasticity between menthol and nonmenthol cigarettes may in fact lead to a substantially different prediction (in
either direction). In that case, the stated- and revealed-preference approaches
can add depth to the analysis of a ban by providing a reasonable range of possible outcomes.
6.2.

Analysis of Illicit Markets

More research is required on the likely impact of a menthol ban on illicit
markets. To the extent that a ban enlarges the illicit tobacco trade, its healthprotective effects will be offset: enforcement of the ban will yield arrests, incarceration, and violence in the illicit market, all of which are known to adversely
affect the health of those involved. A comparison to the existing illicit cigarette
market in the United States offers only limited insight. The illicit market (principally in legitimate cigarettes trafficked across state and country borders to
avoid taxes) is large but has seen a relatively low level of associated violence
(although there are indications that more-violent actors are entering the market). The case of an illicitly trafficked product, the consumption of which is
otherwise legal, is quite distinct from an inherently illicit product. Participants
in today’s cigarette black market may either not know or fully understand the
illegality of their conduct, whereas a menthol user under a ban would be flagrantly skirting the law.
Better insights might be had from studying marijuana markets. Until recently, any marijuana user was aware that she was engaging in an illegal
activity (liberal medical-marijuana laws in many states, and state-level legalization in Washington and Colorado, make this more complicated now). A menthol
smoker, not otherwise disposed to criminal behavior, who now finds himself a
criminal may be disinhibited to other criminal activity, breeding disrespect for
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legitimate authority and eroding social order. A large share of law-enforcement
resources has been devoted to enforcing marijuana prohibition (at the expense
of other crime-control efforts). There are many unknowns regarding the increase in violence that might follow from a menthol ban. Increasing
enforcement in illicit markets tends to foster violence within those markets.
(And, unlike in licit markets, increasing competition in illicit markets does not
necessarily reduce prices. In a vicious cycle, violence among suppliers competing for market share elevates the risk premium to participate in the market,
thereby maintaining high prices, revenues, and continued violence.)
When risk premium are high, profits become big enough to fight for. And
Mexico looms large. If Mexico were to become a significant source for illicit
menthol cigarettes it is possible that its drug-trafficking organizations (notorious for their propensity to violence) would enter the trade; they have many
strategic advantages including well-established smuggling networks and an
established dominance in many border areas. A much better understanding of
the likely violence response is needed to help authorities plan for the lawenforcement resources that will be required to keep the illegal market in check.
And, finally, many of the factors essential to the modeling laid out in this
paper are themselves poorly understood. If we are to estimate the effects of
alternative policies, we require better baseline data on the kinds and extent of
violence attendant to the illicit cigarette trade, the levels and cost of enforcement, the sizes of illicit cigarette markets, and the characteristics of illicit
distribution channels.
7. Conclusions
The risks of evasion and the need for enforcement complicate the problems of tobacco regulation. Higher taxes and tighter regulations, especially
those that create strong gradients across easily-crossed borders, may have
substantial unintended and unwanted consequences, and at some point the
costs of further tightening might exceed the benefits.
Evasion incentives depend not only on the absolute level of taxes and
regulations but on their variation, especially over easily-crossed borders. Lowering taxes in high-tax juris-dictions that consume smuggled cigarettes can
reduce the profitability of smuggling, but so can raising taxes in low-tax source
jurisdictions (which may itself invite other evasions and harms).
Banning specific product types (such as mentholated cigarettes) will tend
to ad-vantage illicit substitutes. Health gains from reduced consumption due to
such bans need to be offset with health and other losses from larger illicit markets. Not applying such par-tial bans to competing nicotine vehicles such as ecigarettes will tend to reduce sales of both licit and illicit tobacco cigarettes. A
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ban on mentholated tobacco cigarettes would be less likely to boost the illicit
market if mentholated e-cigarettes remained available.
In the United States current penalties against tobacco smuggling appear
to be too low to support some of the existing price differentials, suggesting the
need for greater enforce-ment to prevent growth in illicit-market shares (already high in some places). Illicit markets have positive feedbacks through
enforcement swamping and normalization. Increased en-forcement will be more
efficacious and less costly in terms of expenditures and side effects if applied
before market growth than after market growth. It might therefore be advantageous to delay the introduction of potentially illicit-market-enhancing
regulatory changes until adequate enforcement capacity has been put in place.
Too much remains unknown to predict the likely consequences of a ban,
sufficient to formulate policy. We propose a research agenda that would provide
better estimates than are currently available of the demand function for menthol cigarettes, which would allow for predicting the behavioral response to a
ban. The violence attendant to existing markets for illicit drugs compels a better understanding of the relation between available revenues and violent
competition for market share.
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Appendix: Studies Reviewed and a Description of Their Findings
Author, Year

Location

Study Design

Study Period

Main Findings

Goldstein,
Brownstein,
Ryan, & Bellucci, 1989
Rasmussen &
Benson, 1994

New York
City

Longitudinal observational
study of 414 homicide events

8-month
period in
1988

Positive association between enforcement and homicides. Nearly
40% of all homicides events were “systemic.” This was regarded as
primarily due to prohibition/enforcement effects.

Florida

Longitudinal observational
study of 67 Florida counties

1989

Brumm & Cloninger, 1995
Benson, Kim, &
Rasmussen,
1998
Riley, 1998

USA

Longitudinal observational
study of 57 US cities
Longitudinal observational
study of 67 Florida counties

1985

Increased drug enforcement has spillover effect; it increases the
size of the market in adjoining jurisdiction, resulting in higher
violent crime.
No significant association between enforcement and violence.

1983–1987

Measures of enforcement were significantly and positively related
with violent crime.

Longitudinal observational
study of 6 US cities
Longitudinal observational
study in the US
Longitudinal observational
study in Chicago
Longitudinal observational
study of 24 US cities
Longitudinal observational
study of 67 Florida counties

1995

Increased enforcement was associated with increased homicide
rates in 4 of the 6 cities studied.
Enforcement is positively and significantly related to the homicide
rate over the study period.
Lack of formal dispute-resolution mechanism in illicit market and
drug-law enforcement prompted a high level of violence.
Drug enforcement positively significantly associated with violence.

Longitudinal observational
study in the US
Longitudinal observational
study of 62 NY counties
Longitudinal observational
study of 1300 US counties
Longitudinal observational
study using state-level variation in homicides

1993–1996

Miron, 1999

Florida
6 US
cities
USA

Levitt & Venkatesh, 2000
Resignato, 2000

Chicago

Benson, Leburn,
& Rasmussen,
2001
Miron, 2001

Florida

Shepard &
Blackley, 2005
Shepard &
Blackley, 2007
Owens, 2013

New York

Moeller & Hesse,
2013

Denmark

USA

USA

USA
USA
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Longitudinal observational
study of 269 jurisdictions in
Denmark
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1900–1995
4-year period
in the 1990s
Oct. 1992–
Sep. 1993
1994–1997

Increases in the rate of drug arrests were associated with an
increase in violent crime.
6 of 9 enforcement proxies were positively and significantly related to the homicide rate.

1996–2000
1994–2001
Data span
passage–
repeal of
temperance
laws
2000–2009

Enforcement was positively and significantly associated with all
crime, including violent crime.
Greater enforcement during Prohibition was not associated with
an increase in homicides.

A significant relationship between a policy crackdown (which led
to an increase in arrests) and charges for serious violent crime in
the year that followed.

